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The Promise and Threat of Nanotechnology 
Can Environmental Ethics Guide Us? 
Christopher J. Preston 
Abstract: The growing presence of the products of nanotechnology in the 
public domain raises a number of ethical questions. This paper considers 
whether existing environmental ethics can provide some guidance on these 
questions. After a brief discussion of the appropriateness of an environmental 
ethics framework for the task at hand, the paper identifies a representative en-
vironmental ethic and uses it to evaluate four salient issues that emerge from 
nanotechnology. The discussion is intended both to give an initial theoretical 
take on nanotechnology from the perspective of environmental ethics and to 
provide a clear indication of the direction from which environmental resis-
tance might come. 
Keywords: nanotechnology, environmental ethics, nature, fabricated biology, 
evolution. 
1. Introduction 
In the light of the immense hype and publicity that currently surrounds 
nanotechnology, it is somewhat surprising that a search of the Center for 
Environmental Philosophy’s bibliography in early 2004 reveals not a single 
article on nanotechnology by an academic environmental philosopher.1 One 
can loosely speculate why. Perhaps it is that environmental philosophers can 
be a touch technophobic and little inclined to track the latest scientific devel-
opments. They tend to look romantically at what is being lost rather than 
prospectively at what may be around the next corner. When environmental 
philosophers do look forward, their bias towards the living world means that 
they often look towards technologies with the prefix bio- (such as biotech-
nology) rather those with prefixes such as chemo- or nano-. Whatever its 
cause, while professional environmental philosophers have stood on the side-
lines, nanotechnology has surged into popular and scientific consciousness. 
According to the Science Citation Index database, the number of research 
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publications on nanotechnology rose by an average of 27% per year in the 
1990s. The United States government appropriated $792 million in 2004 for 
the National Nanotechnology Initiative, indicating that the technology has 
become a major federal research priority. State and private dollars add con-
siderably to that investment (Greenpeace 2003, pp. 18-20). In popular cul-
ture, nanotechnology looms increasingly large, with the screen version of 
Michael Crichton’s novel Prey expected to be released shortly. From Bill 
McKibben’s cautionary tale Enough (McKibben 2003) to front pages stories 
in the Washington Post (01/31/04), from the visionary ideas of the Foresight 
Institute to a $1.3 million dollar National Science Foundation funded study 
of nanotechnology’s societal and ethical implications,2 from NGO reports on 
emerging technologies to activist protests in Berkeley, California over the 
construction of a carbon nanotube factory, there is already a vigorous and 
contested discourse on what nanotechnology means and what its implications 
might be for society and for the environment. Professional environmental 
ethicists need to join this fray and join it fast. 
2. Environmental Ethics as a Suitable Lens 
There can be no doubt that the philosophical issues surrounding the devel-
opment of nanotechnologies and their products are both interesting and 
complex. In addition to the numerous technological and scientific issues, 
nanotechnology raises profound questions in the philosophy of science, the 
sociology of science, the philosophy of technology, and the philosophy of 
chemistry. It also poses serious political and ethical questions. Nanotechnol-
ogy is fairly unique amongst recent technologies in that there do exist efforts 
to formally address some of these issues. In the United States, early govern-
ment commitments by the Clinton administration, a reasonably long period 
of anticipation for the promises of this new technology to actually arrive, and 
a National Science Foundation sensitized by contentious experiences with 
genetically modified organisms have combined to create a unique rhetorical 
space within which the philosophical questions can be investigated.  
 Included within this emerging discourse are suggestions that nanotech-
nology is so radical and its disciplinary foundations so unusual that it requires 
an entirely new ethical framework, one tailor-made for the issues (Khushf 
2004). So electric is the buzz around nanotechnology that some of those 
cognizant of its implications want a completely clean ethical slate for their 
discussions. Here I argue a different case. The first part of this paper makes 
the case that the discipline of environmental philosophy already provides a 
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particularly suitable framework to bring to bear on many of the pertinent 
questions.  
 The ethical issues that are most often brought up in relation to nanotech-
nologies are almost all issues that have arisen in relation to other environ-
mental promises and threats. Specters such as the threat of biological harm, 
the danger of runaway replicators, the creation of radically new kinds of ma-
terials, the hubris of ‘playing God’ with natural processes, and the threat to 
the meaning of being human are all familiar worries raised by previous tech-
nological developments such as nuclear power, genetically modified organ-
isms, ecosystem restoration, and human genetic therapies. Environmental 
philosophy, one might argue, developed specifically in response to these sorts 
of threats. Optimistic promises by the boosters of nanotechnology such as 
future material abundance, the end of pollution, and the cessation of extinc-
tion are equally familiar to environmental advocates, as is the speculative idea 
of bringing extinct species back from the dead.  
 Like nanotechnology, environmental philosophy is inherently interdisci-
plinary, building bridges between philosophy and ethics on the one hand and 
ecology, biology, and evolution on the other. This means that environmental 
philosophy might be readily adapted to perform the cross-disciplinary inves-
tigations between chemistry, biology, engineering, and philosophy that 
nanotechnology demands. Complex ontological questions raised by 
nanotechnology about the relationship between the natural and the artificial 
are also firmly within the purview of environmental philosophy and have 
been discussed by environmental philosophers in relation to biotechnology 
and genetics. Questions weighted with social rather than environmental di-
mensions – the fear of creating a socio-economic nano-divide, puzzles about 
who can patent nanotechnologies, worries about corporate and government 
abuse, concerns about liability for possible harms caused by nanomaterials – 
are also issues with which environmental ethicists have experience. So while it 
is clear that nanotechnology promises tremendous technological advance-
ment, it is not so clear that it takes us into completely new ethical terrain. 
Turning to an existing ethical framework provides an important economy of 
labor for those addressing the difficult challenges of nanotechnology. It also 
provides a helpful orienting point in what might otherwise be only lightly 
charted territory. So while environmental philosophy certainly should not 
pretend to be the only lens through which to consider the ethical issues that 
nanotechnology generates, it certainly seems that the discipline might be a 
proficient guide for many of them. 
 There is a further consideration at work that makes environmental phi-
losophy a particularly suitable framework to use. This consideration relates 
to a potent guiding metaphor that frequently slips into the discussion of how 
to frame nanotechnological endeavor. Nanotechnology is often cast as a way 
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for humans to fabricate biological and evolutionary processes. It does this 
essentially by building from the atom or molecule up. James Van Ehr, CEO 
of Zyvex, a company dedicated to producing the world’s first molecular as-
semblers, begins his talks on nanotechnology by offering wood and abalone 
shells as prototypical nanomaterials.3 Biology is the proof by example for 
many nanotechnological dreams. The report on nanotechnology by the 
U.K.’s Economic and Social Research Council contains the claim that “cell 
biology offers a proof that at least one kind of nanotechnology is possible” 
(ESRC 2003, p. 7). 
 Kevin Yager of the Barrett Research Group at McGill University in Can-
ada similarly opines that “the best proof comes from nature, which has (over 
the course of billions of years of evolution) created highly sophisticated 
nanometre-sized devices, including catalysts, motors, data encoding mecha-
nisms, optical sensors, etc.”4 The most audacious proponents of nanotechnol-
ogy suggest that the implicit aim of the endeavor is for humans to “do better 
than nature and improve on evolution” (Dinkerlaker 2003). George M. 
Whitesides laid down this gauntlet in Scientific American remarking that “it 
would be a marvelous challenge to see if we can outdesign evolution” (White-
sides 2001). Nanotechnology, seen in this light, is a human effort to fabricate 
biology and to do a better job at it than nature has done. Given this provoca-
tive guiding metaphor, it seems probable that a great number of the ethical 
issues that surround the technology will reside either within environmental 
philosophy or at its intersection with bioethics.  
 A final practical reason for considering nanotechnology through an envi-
ronmental ethics lens has more to do with the way that public perceptions of 
nanotechnology have been developing than with any proposed theoretical 
link between the two. It turns out that much of the emerging and anticipated 
resistance to the development of nanotechnology is coming from the envi-
ronmental community. Canada’s Action Group on Erosion, Technology, and 
Control (ETC), now calling for a moratorium on the commercial production 
of nanoparticles until more is known about their toxicity, is the same group 
that in the past led the fight against genetically modified organisms (ETC 
2003). Berkeley’s Community Environmental Advisory Committee has 
spearheaded protests against the construction of a ‘molecular foundry’ for 
the production of carbon nanotubes at the Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory (Artz 2004). Greenpeace U.K. was one of the first to publish a 
comprehensive discussion paper of the societal implications of nanotechnol-
ogy (Greenpeace 2003). Whether or not it is in fact the case, nanotechnology 
is clearly being perceived as a potential environmental threat. Environmental-
ists are concerned both about the effects of nanomaterials on the biology of 
individual organisms and about the consequences on local and global ecol-
ogies of the widespread dispersion of nanomaterials into the environment. 
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Looking at these technologies through an environmental ethics lens will pro-
vide a better idea of exactly how these threats are perceived by the communi-
ties that are concerned about their development. The first claim of this paper, 
then, is that while a full discussion of the societal implications of nanotech-
nology calls upon a diverse range of specialists from across the humanities 
and the social sciences, the discussion makes particular and targeted demands 
on the skills of the environmental philosopher.  
3. Selecting an Environmental Ethic 
One immediate problem with the intention to look at nanotechnology 
through the lens of environmental ethics is that environmental ethics, like 
nanotechnology, is not a single thing but a diverse and complex cluster of 
issues, theories, and practices. Different environmental ethicists would ap-
proach the promises and threats of nanotechnology in different ways. Some 
environmental ethicists might adhere to a reverence for life ethic, others to a 
form of weak anthropocentrism, a third group might orient themselves 
around an ecosystemic holism, a fourth a deep ecology approach, still others 
would choose an ethic of care.5 It is impossible in one paper to consider how 
each of these frameworks might apply to nanotechnology. But having 
pointed out the diversity of positions that environmental ethics offers, it 
might yet be possible to identify a central environmental intuition that hov-
ers somewhere in the background of many of them. The intention is not to 
argue for the validity of the chosen intuition here. Such arguments fill many 
pages of the environmental ethics literature. Rather, the idea is to identify an 
important ethical principle held by many in the environmental ethics com-
munity and then judge how nanotechnology measures up against it. 
 The one intuition that appears to be common to many environmental po-
sitions is the intuition that there is some value associated with historical evo-
lutionary and ecological processes. The process of evolution and the ecol-
ogies that have resulted from those processes are believed by many environ-
mental ethicists to possess moral considerability. Since evolution is an open, 
random, and stochastic process it is necessary to immediately add a scalar 
modifier to this suggestion. J. Baird Callicott, borrowing much from Aldo 
Leopold, has suggested in this vein that the primary loci of value in an envi-
ronmental ethic are evolutionary and ecological processes that occur “at 
normal spatial and temporal scales” (Callicott 1999, p. 139). If we set aside 
the difficulty of establishing what ‘normal’ would mean in this context, the 
identifiable ethical intuition that remains is that nature deserves moral con-
sideration for its own sake on the basis of the fact that the biotic community 
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is the product of millions of years of natural forces that have generated a sys-
tem that is life supporting, complex, and often diverse.  
 This central ethical intuition is one that can be found in numerous places 
in the environmental literature. Aldo Leopold, Holmes Rolston, III, and 
Robert Elliot provide archetypical articulations. Leopold, for example, states 
“a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty 
of the biotic community, it is wrong when it tends otherwise” (Leopold 
1987, pp. 224-5). Rolston claims that “systemic nature is valuable intrinsi-
cally, as a projective system […] for its capacity to throw forward (pro-ject) 
all the storied natural history” (Rolston 1988, p. 198). Elliot, while trying to 
explain why environmental restorations are morally suspect, remarks that 
“we value the forest and river in part because they are representative of the 
world outside of dominion, because their existence is independent of us” (El-
liot 1982, p. 86). Many other examples could be cited. Even distinct environ-
mental orientations such as the ecofeminist ethic of care appear to share 
some portion of this intuition about the evolutionary process (Preston 2001). 
In each of these cases, the products of non-human, evolutionary processes 
are considered to be worthy of some degree of moral consideration. People 
feel that there is value in the parts of nature that have been created independ-
ently of human activity. Other values often championed by environmentalists 
such as ‘wildness’, ‘beauty’, ‘spontaneity’, ‘complexity’, and ‘ecological integ-
rity’ each have direct or indirect connections to this central intuition about 
the evolutionary process. Exactly how to cash out this value, whether as value 
that is entirely independent of any valuer, or value that requires a human or 
non-human valuer to be ascribed, or value that only gains its merit when it 
functions in human lives in some fashion, has been the subject of vigorous 
debate in environmental ethics for nearly thirty years.6 It is not necessary to 
go into the nuances of these debates here because, for current purposes, it is 
relevant only that each of the positions share a common commitment to the 
significance of the historical evolutionary process. In each case, the historical 
evolutionary process has a moral significance that is distinct from any of the 
products of human intentional activity. Choosing the evolutionary process as 
grounds for environmental value therefore supplies a firm grip on a persistent 
ethical intuition. It also allows us to work with an intuition that crosses over 
well from academic theory into policy and public discourse. Even those un-
familiar with environmental ethics often speak about nature as having some 
ineffable quality possessed by virtue of how it evolved independent of human 
activity.7  
 It is important to emphasize that according to this ethical framework the 
objects in nature that warrant moral concern gain that warrant from being 
products of a particular creative process deemed to be more important than 
any features of the products themselves. The capacities possessed by biotic 
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nature – capacities such as rationality, sentience, or the ability to photosyn-
thesize – do not themselves earn a natural object moral consideration; it is its 
relationship to a historical process that creates the bulk of a natural object’s 
value. As the products of natural evolutionary processes, both river valleys 
and orangutans have natural value, regardless of whether one or the other is 
sentient (Rolston 1994, Katz 1996).  
 A second point to note is that temporal realities dictate that this ethic 
largely excludes any human contributory factor to the value. This is not to 
deny that humans can on selected occasions contribute to natural values by, 
for example, carefully managing a prairie through burning and grazing or by 
restoring a species through captive breeding. Nor is it to deny that humans 
can create their own kinds of intrinsic values through arts and culture. 
Rather, these emblematic types of evolutionary ethics simply indicate that 
environmentalists often have a strong intuition that nature has value in-itself, 
independent of humans. Nature was operating according to its laws long be-
fore humans appeared on the scene. To further emphasize this point, some 
environmental ethicists assert that it is nature’s status as some kind of “radi-
cal other” that creates its moral significance (Birch 1990). This observation 
about the value residing in nature’s otherness makes these ethics mostly 
‘non-anthropocentric’.  
 Before moving on, it may be necessary to quickly speak to one concern 
this orientation raises. Some may find the whole starting point objectionable. 
A large number of people who care about the environment feel that environ-
mental values are always relative to human goods. For these people, it simply 
does not make any sense to talk about intrinsic natural values in some feature 
of nature apart from humans. This analysis, for them, seems to start in the 
wrong place. Furthermore, even those that claim a non-anthropocentric ethic 
might be concerned about the way the environmental intuition described 
above seems to look down on any kind of human manipulation of nature. It 
would be reasonable to object that by choosing the historical evolutionary 
process as the key value in this environmental ethic, the framework of this 
paper already begs the question against nanotechnology by looking nega-
tively upon any human manipulation of nature.  
 While it is true that nature-aside-from-human-manipulation has a major 
role to play in this ethic, the orientation is not as unhelpful as it may at first 
seem. It will become clear below that the value of the evolutionary process 
gives us only a prima facie and defeasible moral obligation towards nature’s 
own creative processes. The value of unmanipulated nature is not an absolute 
one. After all, every organism must manipulate nature in order to stay alive. 
And all organisms, including humans, obey the laws of nature at every mo-
ment in these manipulations. It cannot be the case then that every human 
manipulation of non-human nature is wrong.8 What this orientation can do 
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for us is to set the burden of proof for those that intend to manipulate nature 
in the place that environmentalists tend to assume it belongs, namely leaning 
towards the moral value of the historical evolutionary process. While there 
are a host of problems in determining just how high that burden of proof will 
be, the intuition about the value of non-humanized and naturally evolved 
nature is a useful reference point. And in fact, many proponents of 
nanotechnology may be sympathetic to portions of this ethic. Nanotechnol-
ogy is often advocated for its potential environmental benefits, benefits such 
as pollution detection, hazardous waste clean-up, and energy efficiency. 
Those benefits are often measured in terms of their ability to help us protect 
the evolutionary and ecological values discussed. Both nano-advocates and 
those that protest the development of nanotechnology seem often to have 
the same environmental intuition in mind. 
4. Sampling the Ethical Issues 
The enormous range of nanoproducts envisioned makes any simple ethical 
judgment about nanotechnology impossible. These products range from ten-
nis balls coated with nano-materials to help them retain their bounce to body 
armor made from nano-materials to protect soldiers in combat, from nano-
particle coated bandages already used in many hospitals to nanobots that 
roam the blood stream eliminating undesirables such as cholesterol and can-
cerous blood cells, from nano-sensors in agricultural fields to detect moisture 
and the presence of salts to nano-machines that can be spread over toxic 
waste dumps to neutralize pollution, from nano particles able to deliver tar-
geted drugs in the body to nano-sized interfaces with brain neurons to de-
liver information directly from computers to the brain.9 Making an already 
murky ethical arena more complex in this case is the difficult task of telling 
the science fiction apart from the science fact. Also coloring any potential 
ethical consideration of these products is a tortured history of public policy 
battles over technologies such as nuclear power, agricultural biotechnology, 
and human genetic therapies. Despite these complexities it is easy to see that 
some projected scenarios, for example those of escaped nanobots roaming 
uncontrolled through native ecosystems, are the environmentalist’s worst 
nightmare. Others, for example the development of highly efficient solar 
cells and cheap pollution sensors, are the environmentalist’s dream.  
 One strategy adopted in this paper to help simplify the complex ethical 
terrain is to set aside for the moment a host of issues that are importantly 
associated with the development of nanotechnologies but are in no way spe-
cific to it. These could be loosely categorized as social issues (some of which 
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were mentioned above) such as the proprietary rights of those that develop 
nano-materials, the dangers of creating a socio-economic nano-divide, the 
legal issue associated with nano tort claims, the separation between scientific 
nano-elites and the publics that bear the potential costs of the technologies, 
the privacy issues that nanotechnologies will raise, and associated concerns 
about personal liberties and freedom of information and opinion. While each 
of these is an important issue that in some cases is given particular urgency 
by the development of nanotechnology, there is nothing about these issues 
that is new or distinctively nano. The frameworks provided by existing and 
familiar ethical theories that deal with social questions, such as Rawlsian no-
tions of distributive justice or Lockean ideas of natural rights, are as applica-
ble here as elsewhere.  
 With this attempt to narrow the ethical territory in hand, a useful way to 
proceed is to select a representative sample of the ethical issues that emerge 
out of nanotechnology. The following four are chosen primarily for two rea-
sons. The first is that these issues appear to be the ones that have attracted 
most of the attention of those concerned with the ethics of nanotechnology. 
The second is that they seem to speak most directly to what is worrying 
about nanotechnology from the environmentalist’s perspective. The four is-
sues are as follows: 
1) The creation of radically new types of materials,  
2) The uncontrollable replicator problem, 
3) The use of nanotechnologies to enhance the human condition, and 
4) The projected ability of nanotechnologies to satisfy all human mate-
rial needs.  
These categories are by no means intended to be exhaustive, nor are they mu-
tually exclusive. They do, however, capture a range of the ethical issues that 
nanotechnology presents. They also lend themselves to the kind of modest 
initial environmental ethics analysis that is the goal of this paper.  
4.1 The Creation of New Kinds of Materials 
Top-down and bottom-up types of nano-technologies can create materials, 
structures, and devices of kinds that have never before appeared in nature. 
There are two types of concern this raises for environmentalists. The first is a 
somewhat abstract ontological worry about the ethics of creating new, artifi-
cial kinds that have never been seen before. The second is the question of 
whether biological and ecological systems can continue to function in the 
presence of these new kinds of materials. 
 The first worry has been raised in an articulate way by Keekok Lee in The 
Natural and the Artifactual: The Implications of Deep Science and Deep Tech-
nology for Environmental Philosophy. Through a careful discussion of the na-
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ture of artifacts, of Marx’s understanding of ourselves as homo faber, and the 
role of the machine metaphor in human discourse, Lee suggests that the 
threats to the environment that have hitherto been considered urgent pale 
into insignificance when placed alongside the threat of artificial kinds pro-
duced by nanotechnology. With nanotechnologies, environmentalists have to 
worry not just about the loss of ‘secondary values’ such as nature’s complex-
ity or its alleged stability, they have to also worry about the loss of ‘primary 
values’ such as the very nature of nature as an ontological kind. Nanotech-
nology, Lee claims, is capable of “turn[ing] biotic and abiotic entities into 
artifacts” constituting “a radical threat to the ontological category of the 
natural” (Lee 1999, p. 114). This new threat means that environmental phi-
losophy should orient itself around combating dramatic ontological chal-
lenges rather than axiological ones.  
 There appear to be two reasons why this creation of artificial kinds is a 
problem for Lee and these reasons can both be traced to the ethical intuition 
described above. Lee appears to be worried that the replacement of nature 
with a world of artifacts (“material embodiments of human intentionality”) 
represents a significant ontological loss in itself. Something of considerable 
intrinsic value has disappeared to be replaced by something of less value. 
Nanotechnology threatens a diminution of metaphysical kinds by replacing 
the products of the evolutionary process with something artificial. The sec-
ond reason, clearly not entirely separable from the first, is that this leaves 
humanity in an ethically and psychologically impoverished position. Lee con-
tends that systematic elimination of the natural leads to a “narcissistic civili-
zation.” The narcissistic civilization created by nanotechnology would no 
longer have available the “radical otherness” of nature to keep itself in per-
spective. Lee believes that there is something about the radical alterity of 
unmodified nature that is important. The independence of nature is an “onto-
logical value” that needs to be preserved in order to maintain an appropriate 
sense of where humans fit on earth (Lee 1999). A proper sense of ourselves, 
Lee supposes, is strongly connected to otherness.  
 The ontological worry that Lee articulates does indeed appear to be a loss. 
The environmental intuition detailed above values processes and products 
that are separate from humans. ‘Separate’ here can mean a couple of different 
things. Sometimes it will mean valuing organisms that are self-sustaining 
without human intervention and sometimes it will mean valuing ecosystems 
that have causal histories independent of any human interference. Environ-
mental ethics will tend to grant a Hereford cow, for example, more moral 
standing than a car since, unlike the car, the cow is an ‘autopoietic’ entity or a 
‘teleological-center-of-a-life’ able to sustain itself independently of humans. 
Similarly, these same ethics will tend to grant the North American bison even 
more value than the Hereford cow since the bison’s causal history does not 
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contain human manipulation of the genome in the way that the Hereford 
cow’s does.  
 Lee finds an analogy to the kind of replacement of nature she is con-
cerned about in Bill McKibben’s The End of Nature. In this influential 1989 
book, McKibben pointed out how human activity has quickly led to lives 
lived in a wholly artificial world. According to McKibben, human-caused ef-
fects on the atmosphere and global climate have lead to the replacing of na-
ture with an artifact, an artifact that McKibben sometimes calls “Earth 2” 
(McKibben 1998). Lee presses her argument by claiming that the end of na-
ture to which McKibben drew our attention is less serious than the kind she 
is worried about with nanotechnology. Human-caused global climate change 
is not deliberate in the same way as is the creation of new materials through 
nanotechnology. It is an accidental by-product of human actions. Moreover, 
Lee points out, climate change threatens something metaphysically different 
from the threat posed by nanotechnology. What climate change eliminates is 
nature-unimpacted-by-human-caused-effects (NatureNon-humanized) rather than 
the nature-constructed-by-natural-processes (NatureNatural Kind) that nano-
technology threatens. Lee insists that the latter is a more significant loss.  
 While granting that the environmental ethic we are using as a guide will 
recognize a loss here, it is doubtful that this loss is quite as significant as Lee 
suggests. One reason to suspect Lee is exaggerating her concern is that while 
she is certainly right that environmentalists tend to see more value in cows 
and bison than they do in cars and washing machines, few of them really want 
to ban cars and washing machines. Neither the creation of artifacts, nor the 
creation of artificial kinds, seems in itself to ever be enough for environmen-
talists to talk about prohibitions. If the creation of artificial kinds were itself 
morally objectionable then synthetic chemists creating over 900,000 new 
chemical substances a year would receive much more scrutiny from environ-
mentalists than they currently do (Schummer 2001). For the most part, we 
seem to live alongside artifacts and artificial kinds reasonably well. In some 
cases, we find artifacts such as paintings and antique wooden furniture espe-
cially valuable and appealing. Occasionally we are glad to use artifacts – for 
example, recycled plastic – to prevent us from destroying more of pristine 
nature. While many do lament how our lives are increasingly surrounded by 
artifacts rather than by nature and while others do express some alarm at the 
activities of synthetic chemists, such resistance hardly amounts to an ethical 
basis for a prohibition of nanotechnology.  
 To sustain her case, Lee would have to show two additional things. First, 
she would have to show that there is something particularly significant about 
the creation of artifacts at the nanoscale as opposed to the creation of arti-
facts at the scale of plastic cups, tables and chairs, and climate-changed land-
scapes. There would have to be something about human intentionality em-
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bodied at the atomic or molecular level that is more morally culpable than 
human intentionality embodied at the level of tables and chairs. Unfortu-
nately, making this case would seem to involve indicting chemistry and parti-
cle physics at the same time, a radical position that would be difficult to 
maintain if those sciences are to have any merit at all. The second thing she 
would have to show is that there is a real danger of the products of nanotech-
nology entirely replacing all natural kinds. Except in the ‘grey goo’ scenario – 
discussed in Section 4.2 – this does not seem likely. As long as one’s ethic 
still insisted upon the inherent value of the natural kinds produced by evolu-
tionary processes and as long as it ensured that those natural kinds received 
adequate protection even as more and more artificial kinds were created, 
Lee’s worry about an ontological loss appears to be overstated. An ethic 
based on the value of the evolutionary process simply does not do enough for 
a blanket prohibition on all nanotechnologies since there is nothing about 
nanotechnology that logically entails the total elimination of evolved nature. 
 The argument from the creation of novel materials, however, has another 
side to it, one that seems to have considerably more normative force. This is 
the argument articulated by Canada’s ETC Group. The ETC group has called 
for a moratorium on the production of nanomaterials in the absence of prior 
testing for health, safety, and environmental impacts (ETC 2003). The ETC 
group argues that since both human and other parts of biotic nature evolved 
in environments largely absent of any notable presence of nano-sized parti-
cles, extreme caution should be exercised before exposing biotic organisms to 
these particles.10 The unnatural character of nanoparticles, according to ETC, 
makes them potentially dangerous.  
 Recent studies have indicated that nano-particles do indeed provide prob-
lems for organisms that did not adapt in their presence (Gorman 2002, ETC 
2003). Buckminster Fullerenes in water at 500ppb have been discovered to 
cause brain tissue damage in fish (Oberdörster 2004). Carbon nanotubes 
washed into the lungs of mice have proved resistant to any natural process of 
ejection, causing unusual and long-lasting lesions (Lam et al. 2003). Nano-
tubes also have the ability to make their way into the nucleus of a cell and 
pharmaceutical companies have known for some time that nanoparticles can 
cross the blood-brain barrier (Howard & Maynard 1999, Oberdörster 2003). 
While many companies are hoping to use these features of nanoparticles to 
deliver helpful substances into the human body, it seems clear that the poten-
tial exists for these processes to cause biological harm. Even if the nanoparti-
cles themselves prove to be mostly benign – something beginning to look 
increasingly less likely at this point – Vicky Colvin at Rice University has 
recently shown that known toxins such as PCB’s and pesticides can bind to 
carbon nanotubes and use them as vehicles to hitch a ride into different parts 
of the body (Colvin 2003). 
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 Two observations add to the growing sense of alarm. The first is the wor-
rying lack of research on the human and environmental health and safety ef-
fects of these new materials. The technologies are so new, and the driving 
forces behind their development have been so firmly located in the military 
and the commercial sectors, that health and safety studies have generally been 
neglected.11 The National Nanotechnology Initiative devotes only a very 
small portion of its funds to environmental and biological health studies 
(ETC 2003, p. 3). The second observation is the fact that there is no regula-
tory mechanism in place at all at the moment directed specifically towards the 
unusual mix of quantum and classical properties present at the meso-realm. 
Regulations are still geared towards familiar macro forms of the material. In 
the U.S., carbon nanotubes and buckminster fullerenes are currently regu-
lated in the same way as graphite. Given that it is precisely the differences be-
tween the properties of the classical and the nanoscale materials that make 
the latter so interesting, it seems imprudent for the protocols for the differ-
ent types of materials to be the same. As Eric Drexler of the Foresight Insti-
tute, a nano-booster in most areas, points out “You can’t simultaneously pro-
claim a product is new and has all these novel properties and at the same time 
claim that it can be regulated as if it were nothing different” (Washington Post 
2/1/2004).  
 One quick pause for perspective is appropriate at this point. It is certainly 
possible to overstate worries about the biological and ecological harm attend-
ing non-naturally occurring substances. Our chosen ethic would be unlikely 
to prohibit all artificial kinds. If fear of the unnatural was an absolute norm 
then the first time that pieces of wood were fashioned into a table we might 
have worried about the health effects of tables. It is clear that not all artifacts 
are harmful simply because humans did not evolve alongside of them and 
some (such as multi-vitamin pills) are even believed to be beneficial for health 
under the right circumstances. There is, however, a principled reason for be-
ing more cautious about the fabrication of novel nano-materials than about 
the fabrication of tables and chairs. Past experience with human and envi-
ronmental health suggests that scale is a relevant factor in determining 
whether a material will cause harm to a biological system. Inhalation, absorp-
tion, diffusion, and transmission across natural barriers have all proven to be 
vectors for disease and biological harm that depend upon scale. The introduc-
tion into the human and natural environment of large numbers of nano-
particles before their biological and dispersion effects are well known does 
seem to be a cause for concern.  
 A quick historical comparison is illuminating. The conditions that created 
the public uproar in Europe over genetically modified organisms (GMOs) 
seem to be strikingly similar to what is currently going on with nanotech-
nologies. In the case of GMOs, scientific unknowns over environmental and 
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health effects, the lack of an effective regulatory structure, and an unknowing 
public exposed without their consent by commercial interests combined to 
generate considerable anger and activism amongst environmentalists. Given 
the well-established ethical presumption of informed consent before expos-
ing an individual to a possible danger, this resentment appears to have been 
justified even if it should turn out that the genetically modified crops in ques-
tion were largely benign.12 All of the unsettling factors that motivated resis-
tance to GMOs seem to be in place in the case of the products of nanotech-
nology. The European Union’s Environmental Bureau is seeking to apply to 
nano-materials the same ‘No data, No market’ precautionary principle origi-
nally developed for their chemical industries.13 Given that it is certainly pos-
sible there are real risks to human and environmental health created by the 
newness and scale of nanomaterials, some form of precautionary approach 
seems appropriate. The ethical value of the evolutionary process at the very 
least suggests that the burden of proof lies with those seeking to introduce 
new nanomaterials into the environment rather than with those resisting 
them.  
4.2. A Brief Dip into the Goo 
Most people who have heard or read anything about nanotechnology have 
come across the uncontrolled replicator or ‘grey goo’ problem. It was nano-
booster Eric Drexler who first raised the possibility of nanomachines going 
out of control (Drexler 1986). Drexler pointed out that since molecular 
manufacturing takes place at such a small scale, large numbers of manufactur-
ing units would have to be working simultaneously on the same project in 
order to ever create anything useful on the macro-scale. Practical necessity 
would therefore probably require that such a fabricator be able to reproduce 
itself. In addition to its ability to reproduce itself and perform its manu-
facturing tasks, each fabricator would have to be able to solve the problem of 
directed locomotion in order to be able to procure energy for itself from its 
environment to complete its tasks. The worry Drexler raised was that a popu-
lation of such machines left to its own devices could increase in numbers ex-
ponentially and consume itself out of an environment. The result would be an 
environment transformed into a grey goo of nanobots and their waste prod-
ucts. ‘Green goo’ is an artificially created self-replicating biotic entity that 
carries the same risk. These possibilities are more technically termed global 
ecophagy by omnivorous replicators.  
 Bill Joy, co-founder and chief scientist of Sun Microsystems, suggested in 
an article in Wired Magazine in 2000 that nanotechnology masks too many 
dangers for us to allow ourselves to be seduced by it (Joy 2000). He points 
out that a grey goo scenario could happen by accident or, more worryingly, it 
 The Promise and Threat of Nanotechnology 33 
could happen deliberately. The combination of technologies known as GNR 
(Genetics, Nanotechnology, and Robotics) is so powerful, Joy warns, that it 
will “spawn whole new classes of accidents and abuses”. Self-replicating 
nanobots will make possible knowledge enabled mass destruction (KMD), a 
threat that greatly exceeds any we face today. Joy worries that “we are on the 
cusp of the further perfection of extreme evil, an evil whose possibility 
spreads well beyond that which weapons of mass destruction bequeathed to 
nation states” (Joy 2000).  
 There are plenty of empirical questions about whether the goo threat is 
real. Some commentators doubt that we could ever be foolish enough to let 
loose machines that are able to replicate and nourish themselves. Others sug-
gest that the relatively high energy requirements for such machines preclude 
their possibility. Drexler himself has recently co-written an article that at-
tempts to dispel the worries that his earlier remarks created (Phoenix & 
Drexler 2004). Since one of Phoenix and Drexler’s main points about expo-
nential manufacturing is that nobody but a terrorist would purposefully let 
loose a material that would end up consuming the whole planet – a possibility 
that they refuse to dismiss – an ethical evaluation of the grey goo problem 
initially seems likely to follow the same path as any discussion about a 
powerful technology that has the potential to be used for murderous means. 
The argument would essentially be that such a technology should not be 
allowed to fall into the wrong hands. Nevertheless, consideration of what 
exactly is wrong with self-replicating nanotechnologies in the light of our 
selected ethic is illuminating.  
 An uncontrollable, environment-consuming goo is obviously undesirable 
for reasons of self-interest. This is to say nothing of its lack of aesthetic ap-
peal! But the more interesting moral issue that it raises from an environ-
mental ethics perspective is adroitly anticipated by Joy. Joy states that GNR 
technologies cross a fundamental line when they allow the “replicating and 
evolving processes that have been confined to the natural world […] to be-
come realms of human endeavor” (Joy 2000). If self-locomoting nanobots are 
able to solve problems and to replicate themselves, then the process of natu-
ral selection has been altered. If the fabricators sometimes produce copies of 
themselves that are not perfect, then they will also be able to evolve. It is this 
attempt to reproduce the evolutionary process with artificially created repli-
cators and then let this process loose on an unprepared natural environment 
that is most worrying to the environmental ethicist. The fabricated biology of 
a nanomachine will now be able to interfere directly with the historical evolu-
tionary process, the very thing that is the basis of the environmental ethic. 
 The dangers of amending the evolutionary process to serve human ends 
are many. Some of these problems have already appeared with varying de-
grees of severity in the case of hybridization of plants and other agricultural 
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genetic technologies. The ecological problems of the homogenization of the 
biotic community, the extinction of wild species, the evolution of more per-
sistent insect pests, and the spread of non-native flora and fauna into native 
ecosystems have all accompanied previous human interference with the evo-
lutionary process. But each of these existing problems are just pale shadows 
of the troubles that self-replicating nanomachines could cause.  
 Self-replicating nano-sized fabricators differ from these other human in-
terferences with the evolutionary process in at least three important ways. 
The first is biological dissimilarity. The products of agricultural biotechnol-
ogy are subject to several layers of natural limitation due to their biological 
similarities to natural products of evolution. Because of its biological similar-
ity, a Hereford cow, for example, is subject to many of the same natural 
checks and balances as a bison. Left to its own devices, in fact, the Hereford 
cow will fare considerably poorer in the face of natural forces than the bison. 
But while a cow bred for milk production and docility is biologically similar 
to a bison, a nanomachine is absolutely not. The abiotic self-replicating prod-
ucts of nanotechnology will be so dissimilar to anything that has naturally 
evolved that the chances of there being any natural checks and balances on 
their populations are slim. The second factor that differentiates previous an-
thropogenic disruptions to the global ecology from those of nanotechnolo-
gies is the issue of ecological niche. When humans introduce species like 
kudzu, cheatgrass, and zebra mussels into non-native environments these 
organisms wreak such havoc precisely because there is nothing to check their 
spread outside of their native ecological niche. Since self-replicating 
nanotechnologies lack any native ecological niche at all the likelihood of 
there being any ecological checks on their spread is small. Other than limita-
tions on its energy supply, it is completely unclear what – if any – natural 
factors will limit the reproductive success of an abiotic nanobot. The third 
reason that the prospect of self-replicating nanobots differs from the hy-
bridization of flora and fauna has to do with volume. The sheer number of 
entities that could be produced in a short time by self-replicating nanobots 
makes this prospect dramatically different from any previously known artifi-
cially produced organism. A nanosized particle is one one-hundred-
thousandth of the diameter of a human hair. This means that the number of 
nanomachines required to perform any task at the macro level would have to 
be simply vast. The power of an exponential increase in the number of self-
replicating nano-machines (if they were ever allowed to exist in these kinds 
of numbers) would be simply staggering. Plagues of rats or locusts would 
look like trivial biological phenomena by comparison. 
 Joy’s concern about human interference with the process of evolution 
seems to rest on fairly solid precautionary ground. In Section 4.1 the initial 
reluctance to fiddle with the products of the evolutionary process turned out 
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to be defeasible in the light of the fact that we create many artifacts, even 
biological ones, that are often not dangerous to us. But problem-solving self-
replicating nanobots co-opt not just biology but also the evolutionary proc-
ess itself for human ends. This seems to add a whole different level of ethical 
concern. So regardless of the empirical likelihood of the grey goo scenario 
ever actually occurring, environmental ethicists seem to be on solid ground 
to reject any attempt to create them. The central value of the environmental 
ethic upon which they rely is directly contravened and this provides a good 
reason to object. 
4.3. Human Enhancement Technologies 
A third area of the application of nanotechnologies that raises concerns for 
an adherent of our environmental ethic is the area of human enhancement. 
Ethical questions about enhancements of human health are not uniquely as-
sociated with nanotechnology and discussion of this issue is already well de-
veloped in the medical ethics literature (Parens 1998, Resnik 2000). But 
nanotechnologies are likely in the near future to make possible more subtle 
and effective enhancements including some that will involve dramatic modifi-
cations of the human genome. The ability to operate at the scale of telomeres 
makes possible extending or shortening the life of a cell (Leutwyler 1998, 
McKibben 2003). The projected creation of microscopic nanobots that can 
repair cells from the inside or wander through the bloodstream destroying 
cholesterol and other undesirables promises mark improvements in longevity 
and quality of life. The technologies being developed for molecular assembly 
will make direct genetic manipulation easier and cheaper than before. Nano-
visionaries believe that these kinds of technologies will dramatically improve 
health and delay aging. Some even suggest that nanotechnology brings hu-
man immortality within reach (Drexler 1986). 
 In addition to these versions of human enhancement that work with the 
patient’s existing biology, there are other areas of nanotechnology that see 
the real promise as lying in a new synthesis of the biotic and abiotic. The abil-
ity to construct machines with parts that are no bigger than neurons offers 
the possibility of tying the electrochemical activity of the brain directly into 
electronic circuits. Significant progress is being made on interfacing biologi-
cal materials directly with nanomaterials (Webster et al. 2004). The proposed 
area of research known as Nano-Bio-Info-Cogno (NBIC) combines nano 
and biological technologies with information technologies and cognitive sci-
ence. NBIC pursues the goal of human-machine hybrids (or cyborgs) that 
can outperform existing humans in numerous ways.  
 The prospect of enhanced cyborgian humans with microelectronic im-
plants that increase their memories or genetic enhancements that increase 
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their intelligence has provoked a predictably strong reaction from political 
and environmental commentators. Francis Fukuyama, addressing mainly the 
application of traditional biotechnologies to human enhancement has la-
mented that our ‘posthuman’ future would be a troubling one in which many 
of the social and political frameworks that have been successfully developed 
to accompany our existing concept of human nature would no longer be ef-
fective (Fukuyama 2002). Liberal democracies work, Fukuyama believes, be-
cause they fit the way we naturally are, a condition that promises to be ir-
revocably changed by biotechnology. For similar reasons, Bill McKibben – 
more alert than Fukuyama to how nanotechnologies bear on this debate – has 
asked us to yell a technology-halting “Enough!” to post-humanism through 
nanotechnology. McKibben makes the case that it is our very mortality and 
imperfection that makes life meaningful (McKibben 2003). Without death, or 
with significantly longer lives, or even with some of the more modest en-
hancements promised by nanotechnicians, McKibben questions how mean-
ing-generating pastimes such as staying physically fit or mentally alert could 
continue to provide us with the same rewards.  
 The arguments for and against human enhancement are complex. The fact 
that many of the enhancements discussed are still squarely in the realm of 
science fiction makes them harder to think about in a principled way. It is 
difficult, for example, to reflect on a human future that does not include 
death. The ethical frameworks that we might use – utilitarianism, rights, 
autonomy – all seem seriously compromised in certain ways. Nevertheless, 
there is a range of arguments that can be leveled against human enhancement. 
Some are social justice arguments that deal with the issue of who will have 
access to these technologies and who will profit from them. Others are ar-
guments specific to human biology and include concerns about the unknown 
health effects of human enhancement, worries about the homogenization of 
the human genome, and arguments like McKibben’s about potential loss of 
meaning given a changing human potential. There is also suspicion of ‘playing 
God’ in addition to a simple aesthetic revulsion towards cyborgs.  
 The first point to note about human enhancement from the perspective of 
one that values historical evolution is that our existing genetic and biological 
inheritance is indeed held to be something worth protecting. Our biological 
inheritance takes the particular form it does as the result of epochs of crafting 
at the hands of the very natural selective pressures that are valued. It is pre-
cisely this history that environmental ethics has identified as being valuable. 
Aldo Leopold displayed his commitment to the value of this historical lineage 
when he embraced the sound of a sandhill crane as “a trumpet in the orches-
tra of evolution” and the crane itself as wearing “a paleontological patent of 
nobility” (Leopold 1987, pp. 96-7). Others argue that the genetic material 
inside an organism, perhaps more than the organism itself, is the carrier of 
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the evolutionary value because the genome symbolically embodies the evolu-
tionary process. With DNA, Holmes Rolston, III has suggested, “earth 
gained memory” (Rolston 1988, p. 98). It is the memory of the eons embod-
ied in DNA that makes a token organism valuable. So any alteration to the 
human genome will be problematic for a person committed to the value of 
the historical evolutionary process.  
 However, beyond this initial acknowledgement of the value that organ-
isms and their genomes inherit from their evolutionary past, environmental 
ethicists will soon find themselves deferring to medical ethicists once they 
recognize that there are a large number of medical procedures performed on 
humans today that already tamper with this evolutionary inheritance. In vitro 
fertilization and other reproductive technologies make it clear that humans 
do not think it necessary to stick with the evolutionary hand we have been 
dealt. Commonplace medical technologies such as artificial hips, heart pace-
makers, and retinal implants already tinker with our inherited biology and 
raise the issue of human cyborgs (Haraway 1991). Innoculations and even 
multivitamin pills demonstrate that we are seldom happy with the function-
ing of the biological machinery with which we were born. Attempts by medi-
cal ethicists to find principled reasons for restricting manipulations of the 
human body and its genome have met with mixed success. Distinctions such 
as the one between therapy and enhancement have proven notoriously slip-
pery. Other distinctions based, for example, on the degree of invasiveness of 
a particular method of treatment or on how much of an original biological 
process is left intact after treatment have varying degrees of traction. Even in 
the cases in which useful distinctions are still made, it is clear that there exists 
no absolute prohibition on anthropogenic manipulations of either the human 
body as a naturally evolved biological organism or its genome as a representa-
tive of a biological kind. Given what is already agreed to be ethically accept-
able, the environmental intuition selected above does not appear to contain 
grounds for a blanket prohibition on human enhancement through 
nanotechnology.  
 But this being said, the environmental intuition identified can still provide 
a helpful orientation to the question of what may or may not be acceptable 
degrees of manipulation of human biology or the human genome. There is 
one class of enhancements envisioned by nano-enthusiasts that are distinctive 
because their advocates seem to have in mind not only the goal of improving 
human health but also the goal of fundamentally changing what we mean by a 
human being. The Extropy Institute, for example, interested in the possibility 
of ‘transhumanism’, unabashedly claims, “We aim to gradually but firmly 
change the rules of the game called ‘being human’.” Their startling mission 
statement goes on saying that “many of us passively accept or stridently de-
fend the inevitability of human stupidity, malice, conflict, aging, and death 
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[…]. The primitive parts of our brain spur us to envy, to hate, to despair, and 
to kill. Our philosophies and our religions attempt to express our highest 
values, yet we use them to oppress and control. We use them to crush the 
world’s complexity into a simplicity that we can clutch like a security blanket 
for the human condition […].” Their mission statement encourages us not to 
remain “slaves to our evolutionary history” and invites us to participate in 
their quest to “connect and cultivate the ingenious and intrepid shapers of 
the future”.14 
 Such a statement illuminates possible grounds for the environmentalist to 
object to some forms of human enhancement through nanotechnology. If 
the intention is to use the technology to deliberately divorce humans from 
our evolutionary and ecological past, then the holder of an environmental 
ethic that values the evolutionary process can loudly object. The statements 
of the Extropy Institute are examples of such an intention. It would not be 
consistent for the environmental ethicist to champion the evolutionary proc-
ess and then to embrace a post-human future that depended upon departing 
from this heritage. The chosen environmental intuition therefore provides a 
reason to be suspicious of manipulations that dramatically change the mean-
ing of what it is to be human. While the line that the environmentalist wishes 
to draw will likely prove to be fairly fuzzy and tricky to administer, this 
fuzziness would certainly not be unique amongst the tough questions that 
reside within medical ethics. Environmental ethics for its own part still wres-
tles with the question of the degree to which humans are (or should remain) 
natural beings and so will certainly have a difficult time establishing what is 
to count as an undesirable departure from our ecological and evolutionary 
heritage. But at the very least, the commitment to the value of the evolution-
ary process sets the burden of proof in such a way that it provides a good 
starting point for the discussion.  
4.4. Projections about Satisfying all Human Needs 
This category is a broad catch-all for many of the promises of the nano-
boosters that have escaped mention already. These promises include unargu-
able benefits such as overcoming material scarcity, eliminating pollution, cre-
ating unlimited low cost solar power, ending poverty, curing cancer or the 
common cold, restoring extinct species, and making available to everyone 
cheap and powerful computers. Mark Modzelewski, Executive Director of 
the Nanobusiness Alliance, states confidently “the importance of nanotech-
nology to the future of mankind cannot be overstated. Nanotech’s promise is 
clean industries, cures for disease, nearly unlimited energy supplies, a con-
tinuance of Moore’s Law, and perhaps the end of hunger” (Ecologist 2003, p. 
36). Others suggest advances in the quality of life comparable to those 
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achieved after the industrial revolution (ESRC 2003). One of the reasons for 
including this broad additional category is to bring attention to the politics of 
promoting nanotechnology. It is a veritable utopia that the nano-boosters 
describe. 
 The first thing that the environmentalist will notice about all these prom-
issory notes is that they have a ring of familiarity to them. Most technologi-
cal optimists have promised futures in which we would apparently be free to 
sit on the beach soaking up the sun while the little drudgery left in the work-
place was performed by machines. Humans are continually assured by cornu-
copians that they will soon be freed up to do nothing but pursue art, recrea-
tion, and rewarding personal relationships. As has proven to be the case with 
these previous utopian promises, there is reason to be skeptical about the 
likelihood of these conditions ever coming about. The promises are made 
expressly to sell a project or a product. The benefits are touted particularly 
loudly when the public is getting a hunch that there also might be some risk 
associated with the product. Electricity too cheap to meter was never a result 
of nuclear power, nor did its boosters ever think to offer any warnings about 
the health and safety issues associated with the disposal of nuclear waste. The 
Pollyanna attitude towards technological futures is often vastly misleading. 
 Environmentalists that value the historical evolutionary process have par-
ticular reasons to see through this kind of talk. Such rhetoric may encourage 
people to drop their guard with prudential actions that are important today. 
The promise of electricity too cheap to meter does not encourage energy 
conservation in the present. The promise of the end of resource scarcity can 
do nothing but foster the profligate use of currently available resources. 
Promises to end all pollution and clean up all toxic waste dissuade people 
from worrying about the messes they are creating today. In each case, exist-
ing environmental values such as clean water, intact habitat, and species di-
versity end up being imperiled by the extreme optimism of the boosters of a 
technology. Since ecological harms like extinction are not likely to be re-
versible, it seems prudent to be initially skeptical of the kinds of promissory 
images that many of the boosters of nanotechnology promulgate.  
 On the other hand, since the promises and threats of nanotechnology are 
so multiple and varied, it also seems wise to evaluate them on a case-by-case 
basis. Better pollution sensors made possible by nanotechnology are hard for 
environmentalists to reject. Materials made out of carbon nanotubes that are 
6 times stronger than steel and 100 times lighter make possible vehicles for 
transportation that would be vastly more energy efficient than current mod-
els. Nanobots that can descend into the depths of contaminated sites and 
neutralize the pollutants found there are an attractive prospect if safeguards 
are in place to prevent them from causing additional environmental harm of 
their own. All of these new technologies would make possible the preserva-
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tion and restoration of habitat, which in turn might enable natural evolution-
ary processes to continue. In each case, the costs and benefits of a technology 
should be weighed in much the same fashion as any cost and benefit is 
weighed; using tried and tested ethical structures to make the calculations. 
Such calculations demand a sober analysis of the relevant risk in order to be 
meaningful. Unfortunately, there is normally a bias against doing adequate 
risk analyses when a product promises great commercial gain. The case of 
genetically modified crops in the United States is an example of commercial 
interests rushing a product to market without adequate consideration or even 
public admission of possible costs. The same thing appears to be happening 
today with carbon nanotubes. Concerns about the possible toxicity of nano-
particles discussed in Section 4.1 have to remain clearly in view. Serious con-
sideration of where the burden of proof lies will remain important. Doug 
Parr, chief scientific advisor to Greenpeace UK, reminds us of how easy it is 
to confuse “no evidence of risk” with “evidence of no risk” (Ecologist 2003, 
p. 38). The European Union’s “no data, no market” policy again seems ap-
propriate. 
 Nanotechnology comes with both utopian and dystopian visions. In The 
Arrogance of Humanism David Ehrenfeld pointed out the danger of quasi-
solutions, solutions that solve one problem while creating several others 
(Ehrenfeld 1978). Nanotechnology, with such lofty goals and so little known 
about its effects on biology and ecology, is a fertile arena for generating 
quasi-solutions. Sometimes it is good to be spurred on by optimistic visions 
about what a developing technology might do for the human condition. 
However, environmental ethics can indicate when that vision is becoming 
distorted. If the vision explicitly includes the goal of fabricating biology and 
outdesigning evolution, almost all existing environmental ethics will object 
on both prudential and theoretical grounds. The grey goo scenario is just the 
most extreme example of a number of dystopian possibilities which, while 
they need not be used as reasons for abandoning some of the real promises of 
nanotechnology, should at least be kept in mind alongside the rosy futures 
outlined by its more enthusiastic advocates.  
 Those who value the evolutionary process will also always insist that 
whatever benefits to humankind are promised by nanotechnology, an ethical 
obligation will remain to continue to protect existing natural diversity. Bald 
eagles and high deserts, temperate rainforests and two-toed salamanders will 
all continue to be of inherent value even in the face of whatever technological 
developments are in the pipeline. Those that value the evolutionary process 
will continue to advocate their protection. With this in mind, these advocates 
will likely be moderately skeptical of the most optimistic promissory notes of 
nanotechnology and be prepared to proceed cautiously with the develop-
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ments that appear capable of delivering the greatest environmental benefits 
for the least amount of risk. 
5. Conclusion 
There were two goals in this paper. The first was to suggest that environ-
mental ethics supplies an appropriate framework to begin to consider many 
of the most salient ethical issues surrounding emerging nanotechnologies. 
The second was to take a representative environmental ethic, one with wide 
appeal and broad applicability, and to evaluate a number of the most fre-
quently discussed promises of nanotechnology through the lens of this ethic. 
An environmental ethic that values the evolutionary process proves to offer a 
number of prima facie reasons to be cautious about many of the promises and 
threats of nanotechnology. However, because it proves harder than expected 
to make conceptually clear distinctions between the products of nanotech-
nologies and those of existing chemical and biological technologies such as 
plastics and in vitro fertilization, the reasons for caution are often advisory 
rather than absolutely prohibitive. Only in a few cases do the promises and 
threats of nanotechnology send up particularly strong red flags. One of these 
is the case of the introduction of radically new materials into human and 
natural environments, materials that may prove to be biologically and ecol-
ogically harmful. Another is the case of technologies that consciously seek to 
replicate the process of evolution by natural selection. A third is the prospect 
of using nanotechnologies to enhance humans away from their inherited evo-
lutionary identity. The latter of these two are occasions in which the devel-
oper of the technology seems to be too carried away with the idea of a fabri-
cated biology. The red flags that this behavior raises are likely to provide 
strong rallying points for activist communities.  
 The quick evaluation performed here in the light of the selected ethic is in 
no way intended to exhaust the range of ethical considerations relevant to 
nanotechnology. There are plenty of additional tests – both environmental 
and social – that nanotechnologies will have to pass before any of them can 
be embraced with the kind of enthusiasm of their boosters. But the analysis 
does provide warnings worth heeding at a time when the environmental 
community is just beginning its mobilization against the threats of nanotech-
nology it perceives. 
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Notes
 
1 The bibliography is available through the Center for Environmental Philosophy 
[www.cep.unt.edu]. Lee 1999, which will be discussed below, is a rare example of a 
monograph in environmental philosophy that specifically discusses nanotechnol-
ogy. 
2 See nanoScience and Technology Studies at the University of South Carolina 
[nsts.nano.sc.edu]. 
3 Van Ehr made this claim at his keynote address at the University of South Caro-
lina’s “Imaging and Imagining the Nanoscale” conference in Columbia, SC, March 
4-7, 2004. 
4 See Yager’s opinion piece at 
[www.barrettresearch.ca/teaching/nanotechnology/nano01.htm]. 
5 For notable contemporary proponents of each of these approaches see Taylor 
1986, Norton 1987, Rolston 1988, Drengson & Inoue 1995, and Warren 2000. 
6 For just a sample of these debates see the special issue of the Monist on intrinsic 
value (Monist, 75, 1992). 
7 The congressional testimony in support of the 1973 U.S. Endangered Species Act 
is replete with examples of lawmakers trying to find ways to express this intuition. 
8 There is a large and complex question lurking beneath this paragraph about 
whether humans are natural beings and consequently whether human manipula-
tions of nature are natural or unnatural events. I will studiously avoid any attempt 
to answer this question here. It is one of the hardest questions in environmental 
ethics. But it is worth noting in this regard that very few people believe that every 
human action that impacts nature – including detonating nuclear bombs, making 
tigers extinct, converting forest into parking lots – is as natural as every other. 
9 The examples come from a number of sources including The New York Times 
(11/21/03), The Ecologist (May 2003), Scientific American (September 2001), and 
No Small Matter II (2003). 
10 Exactly how much nanosized material we were exposed to over evolutionary time 
is unclear. Some natural salts that evaporate from the ocean are nanosized. Some 
carbon products of combustion are also nanosized. Scientists have recently dis-
covered part of biotic nature they call ‘nanomes’. The possible existence of natu-
rally occurring nanobacteria is still under debate (New Scientist, 19 May, 2004). 
11 The Center for Biological and Environmental Nanotechnology (CBEN) at Rice 
University is one of the few research establishments devoted to investigating these 
health and safety issues. 
12 See ‘UK Scientists Back GM Maize Crops’ at 
[newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/ 
tech/3532927.stm]. 
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13 See ‘EU Chemicals Policy’ at [www.eeb.org/activities/chemicals/main.htm]. 
14 See [www.extropy.org]. 
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